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philosophy,  and  the  human  sciences,  arguing  that  the  interdisciplinary  work  of 
contemporary legal scholarship expresses legal culture's uneasiness about intellection. In 










strands  marked  by  contrasting  responses  to  this  double  uneasiness.  In  particular,  the 
recent development of critical scholarship on both the left ("CLS") and right ("law and 
economics") in the United States might be understood as accommodations of this common 
difficulty.  This  suggests  a  continuity  in  contemporary  legal  scholarship  stronger  than 
academics of these strands generally assert. 
                                            
* Professor of Law and Faculty Director of the Institute for Global Law and Policy at Harvard Law School. 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teaches international law, international economic policy, legal theory, law and development and European law. 







work  combined  European  antitrust  litigation,  government  relations  advising  and  general  corporate  law.  A 
member  of  the  US  Council  on  Foreign  Relations,  he  serves  as  Chair  of  the  World  Economic  Forum’s  Global 
Advisory Council on Global Governance. Email: dkennedy@law.harvard.edu 
+  Back  in  1986‐88  readers  of  this  contribution  could  be  expected  to  be  aware  of  the  “contemporary  legal 
scholarship“ which is sketched out in this article. Today a lot of footnotes would be necessary to make the many 
references to – then – ongoing debates more transparent. We have decided, however, not to change the original 
and to thus impart some flavor of the 80ies. 2011] 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I am particularly concerned with two broad transitions in legal scholarship over the last 


















alterations  in  participating  legal  scholars'  accommodative  strategies  to  the  common 





















The  term  "mainstream"  is  an  entirely  different  matter.  For  one  thing,  mainstreamers' 





































about  ideas.  On  the  one  hand,  law  and  legal  academia  present  themselves  as  humbly 



















the  intellectual  in  myriad  ways:  in  the  historically  parallel  consolidation  of  the  legal 
profession  and  academy,  in  the  demands  which  legal  argument  has  made  since  the 




















































time,  their  insights  into  the  extremely  flexible  relationship  between  given  legal 








culturally  pervasive,  legal  theory  and  doctrine  have  come  to  seem  weaker  and  less 
persuasive.  Doctrinal  argument  seems  increasingly  complex  and  ever  less  able  to 
determine outcomes. The normative moorings of the most basic doctrinal discourse by 
lawyers,  scholars  and  judges  seem  infirm.  Legal  principles,  rules  and  policy  arguments 
seem  to  dissolve  far  too  easily  into  thin  disguises  for  assertions  of  interest.  The  more 
diverse the sphere of an argument's application, the thinner it seems to become until its 
manipulability becomes more apparent than its persuasive clout. The result has been ever 
more  polarized  arguments,  ever  more  sophisticated  doctrinal  diversity,  and  ever  more 
narrowly applicable holdings. 
 2011] 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At the same time, legal theory seems both bogged down in controversy and increasingly 
irrelevant  to  the  work  of  legal  practice.  Descriptions  and  analyses  of  doctrinal 



















used  to  provide  a  structured  (even  a  legally  structured)  base  for  or  alternative  to  the 



























profusion  makes  possible.  Neither  an  economic/political  account  of  a  legal  process 





Despite  this  strength,  however,  it  is  easy  to  imagine  how  a  proliferation  of  complexly 



















practice  of  academic  criticism  came  to  be  the  deployment  of  realist  insights  against 
precisely such reconstructions. As one after another human science was deployed in legal 








traveler  exacts  a  toll.  Traversing  foreign  terrain  –  whether  as  a  legal  comparativist  or 2011] 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methodological eclectic – is troubling in a couple of ways. If undertaken to enrich the law, 
the  project  threatens  the  scholar's  loyalty  to  his  own  discipline.  One  ponders  the 






insights.  How  long  will  legal  scholars  find  psychiatry  fascinating?  Aren't  they  already 




Despite  these  difficulties,  post  realist  legal  culture  seems  by  and  large  to  have  been 
sustained  rather  than  sabotaged  by  their  complex  relationship  to  the  world  of  ideas. 
Although it seems that the eclectic might be consumed, professionally and theoretically 






contemporary  legal  work.  My  sense  is  of  a  scholarly  community,  perhaps  an  industry, 
sustained not by a shared sense of problems to be addressed or criteria for evaluating 
resolution,  but  rather  by  a  collective  practice  of  shrewd  equivocation,  by  which  every 







decision  (known  by  literary  interpretation  and  linguistics),  legislative  fiat  (known  by 




or  philosophical  reflection  imagines  a  stable  practice  known  only  as  a  hope  –  just  as 




the realist's critique of law's independence and authority. It is difficult at first to see how            [Vol. 12 No. 01  346  German Law Journal 
such crude imported references could do the job – especially in the face of shrewd collegial 
critique.  One  partial  explanation  might  be  provided  by  the  mainstream  post‐realist's 











writing  about  doctrine  this  way:  suddenly,  if  repeatedly,  he  stumbles  on  difficulties  of 
fragmentation,  undecidability  and  uncertainty,  and  he  invokes  another  discipline, 
remembering – himself, on another day, in another mood, steadfast. 
 
In  this  way,  the  interdisciplinary  practice  and  scholarship  of  the  typical  post‐realist 
reinforce one another. The sophistication of the practice – its imbedded uncertainty – is 
buttressed  by  the  clarity  of  the  scholarly  narrative.  If  the  practice  seems  crude,  the 
scholarship is tenuous, delicate, finely nuanced and open‐ended. When the scholarship 
seems fragmented, it remembers the practice, and so on. All these references back and 
forth  across  the  boundary  between  thinking  and  doing,  between  a  rejection  and  a 
transcendence  of  intellection,  when  things  go  right,  give  post‐realist  work  a  positive 
forward spin. 
 
It  is  important  to  realize,  however,  that  it  is  the  work,  the  judgment,  which  seems 
authoritative,  confident.  The  mainstream  legal  scholar  himself  seems  lost.  For  all  the 
elaborate  self‐reference  of  much  post‐realist  legal  writing,  this  delicate  textual 



















construction  is  extremely  difficult  to  undo.  Shrewdly  equivocal  and  passionately 









deploys  criticism  to  clear  the  ground  for  his  own  reimaginative  project.  Although  an 
integral  part  of  the  post‐realist  enterprise,  however,  this  criticism  seems  uneasily 
restrained. Post‐realist work typically relates to criticism much as it relates to intellection, 

































































of  empiricism  and  formalism.  Normally,  by  contrast,  the  post‐realist  undertakes  his 
constructive theoretical work with the tools of intuition and aesthetics.  






reversed,  these  distinctions  mark  the  difference  between  theory  and  doctrine  in  the 
constructive work. 
 
Post‐realist  criticism,  on  the  other  hand,  often  achieves  its  bite  by  reversing  these 
associations. Doctrinal formulations which had been formally elaborated are criticized for 
their  moral  bankruptcy.  Theoretical  elaborations  which  were  idealistic  are  criticized  as 










construction.  And  a  shifting  identity  only  seems  sustainable  so  long  as  aesthetics  and 
analytics remain compatible – with each other as much as with law. But this does not seem 
possible for long. Indeed, the post‐realist's basic experience of empiricism is its contentless 
generality,  its  obliteration  of  meaning,  just  as  his  basic  experience  of  morality  is  its 
groundless individuality. 
 
We  might  summarize  the  mechanism  by  which  the  post‐realist  elides  this  dilemma  by 
saying  that  mainstream  scholarship  works  by  displacing  into  the  difference  between 
alternative disciplines (science and morality) a distinction which it seeks to blur within the 
law  itself  (doctrine  and  theory).  The  movement  occurs  through  the  juxtaposition  of 
constructive and critical voices in the post‐realist text. 
 







Justice  Benjamin  Cardozo  put  it  this  way:  "History  or  custom  or  social  utility  or  some 
compelling sense of justice or sometimes perhaps a semi‐intuitive apprehension of the 
pervading spirit of our law must come to the rescue of the anxious judge and tell him 











































time, severing them from their fluid interrelationship with their negation in mainstream 2011] 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work,  and  extend  them  seriously  until  they  succeed  or  collapse.  Thus,  the  CLS  scholar 
might  both  assert  that  although  law  and  politics  are,  as  the  mainstream  maintains, 









where  the  mainstream  rejected  its  insights  and  to  have  refused  realism's  idealism  or 
empiricism  or  skepticism  where  the  mainstream  extended  the  realist's  departure  from 











method  and  problematic.  Although  the  problem  posed  by  the  mainstream  remained 
central,  law  and  economics,  especially  at  its  most  exuberant  moments,  claimed  –  in  a 
telling repudiation of the mainstream's careful equivocation – to have found an answer. 
Gone was the hesitation about method, the uneasiness about both abstract models and 














away from the mainstream's unease about intellection to conspicuous erudition. For law            [Vol. 12 No. 01  352  German Law Journal 
and economics, the road to rebellion seemed a radical completion of the mainstream's 
program,  whatever  the  methodological  consequences.  If  you  want  to  resolve  these 
agonizing difficulties, to be free of your anxious indecision, they seemed to say, watch this. 
CLS, on the other hand, sidestepped the program to pursue its rebellion in the lexicon of a 






terrain  except  to  the  extent  he  replaces  mainstream  hesitancy  about  theory  with 
conspicuous  erudition.  But  just  as  the  mainstreamer's  critical  demand  for  intellection 
intruded  on  his  legal  autonomy,  so  the  critic's  desire  to  take  seriously  doctrine's 
autonomous claims threatens his intellection. Moreover, the CLS scholar remains a legal 
academic, gripped by the profession's paradoxical relationship to other disciplines. To the 






been  particularly  influential  in  CLS  work  as  examples:  critical  theory  and  structuralism. 
Although most recent interdisciplinary foraging has continued rather than questioned the 
tendency to oscillate between complementary forms of theoretical and doctrinal work, 





maneuver  has  more  often  repeated  than  resolved  or  rejected  the  difficulties  which 
motivated it. 
 







the  theory/practice  circle.  These  messages  seem  much  more  important  than  any 
"application"  of  these  traditions  in  critical  legal  scholarship.  Indeed,  the  very  offhand 
quality of their invocation (often reduced to a self‐effacing string‐cite in a first footnote) 
mocked the idea of methodological application or interdisciplinary importation even as it 2011] 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seized the intellectual high ground. If atypical of scholars importing any particular non‐
legal  intellectual  tradition,  this  mockery  was  quite  consistent  with  the  mainstream's 
general uneasiness about association with the complexities of "fancy theory". These two 






historical  subject  failed  to  fulfill  this  role,  critical  theory  developed  a  rich  literature  of 
explanation, critiquing the social mechanisms which are thought to reproduce alienation. 
Each critique was supplemented by a relocation of the aspiration for liberation. Brought 
into  law,  this  theoretical  enterprise  became  associated  with  a  dialectical  historical 
revisionism  and  a  series  of  increasingly  formulaic  excuses  for  continued  injustice  – 
supplemented by a heroic invocation of practice. 
 
Structuralism,  on  the  other  hand,  was  understood  to  have  begun  by  suspending  the 
question of historical origin, separating the fluid present moment from the text of its past 
and  future.  This  suspension  of  the  search  for  historical  transcendence  permitted  an 
elaborate series of explorations into the relational nature of meaning. But these analyses 

















complicated  than  that.  If  challenged  on  the  reductions  necessary  for  the  project  as  a 
whole, the CLS scholar can easily beef up his imported literature. Critical theory seems to 
worry  about  nothing  so  much  as  its  reliance  on  a  historical  subject,  and  structuralism 
seems preoccupied precisely with avoiding the mechanics of form. 
            [Vol. 12 No. 01  354  German Law Journal 








structuralism  to  complete,  pursue  or  radicalize  the  mainstream  project  of  doctrinal 
elaboration and construction, and of critical theory to complete, pursue or radicalize the 









long  period  an  unassailable  combination,  challenging  the  mainstream  even  as  it 
recapitulated,  even  deepened  and  honored,  the  mainstream's  interdisciplinary  method 
and eclectic rhetorical style. 
 




for  the  valorization  of  a  posited  transcendental  subject,  just  as  structuralism,  has 
encouraged  the  tendency  to  posit  an  origin  for  autonomously  investigable  doctrinal 
activity.  As  a  result,  neither  critical  theory  nor  structuralism  has  provided  a  "method" 
which lawyers can "deploy" against their theoretical and doctrinal malaise. Although useful 
in  establishing  a  stance  against  mainstream  scholarship,  they  have  not  proved  able  to 
sustain a long term project of critical analysis. 
 
Instead,  much  critical  legal  scholarship  has  simply  oscillated  between  assertions  of 
doctrinal indeterminacy sustained by a social theory and invocations of social spontaneity 
sustained by mechanical doctrinal or rhetorical maneuver. It is little wonder, then, that CLS 





must  struggle  to  ground  his  fluid  maneuver  somewhere.  Despite  his  affirmation  and 2011] 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Legal 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relationship  between  law  and  thought  models  what  was  perhaps  critical  legal  studies' 

























It  is  perhaps  too  early  to  begin  documenting  developments  within  CLS.  In  a  most 
preliminary way, however, it does seem that something about the tone and style of CLS 
work has changed over the past decade, particularly as younger scholars, many trained at 







































bracketed  by  structuralism  without  falling  into  the  mechanical  determinism  or 
transcendental nostalgia characteristic of late critical theory. Their work shifts among the 
























thing,  such  a  strong  departure  from  the  mainstream  –  even  if  it  seemed  simply  an 
extension of what CLS had been doing all along and no more dramatic in its move to 












certifiably  erudite  European.  This  wave  of  European  theoretical  work  is  about  refusing 
precisely the model of theoretical application, philosophic importation, indeed of definitive 





much  post‐modern  legal  scholarship  echoes  a  great  deal  that  was  familiar  to  the 
mainstream and to earlier CLS types. For example, like the mainstream, the post‐modern 
moves subtly between legal text and legal culture, recapitulating the move to theory as 
supplement  for  an  argument  of  historical  context  or  doctrinal  elaboration.  At  this 
preliminary  level,  moreover,  it  seems  that  the  distinctions  within  post‐modern  legal 
scholarship between say, Foucault and Derrida or feminists and Frenchmen recapitulate 
the relationship between critical theory and structuralism which kept CLS in legal discourse 






strongly  asserted  indeterminacy  of  both  historical  causation  and  doctrinal  elaboration 
coupled with, surrounded by, imbedded in, some crude theory of historical agency. So 
here,  we  find  the  indeterminacy  of  legal  doctrine  and  the  impossibility  of  definitive 
historical  accounts  passionately  defended,  and  often  imbedded  in  some  theory  of 
narrative, of perspective or of the priority to be accorded some particular "telling". 
 










relationship  between  the  mainstream  and  CLS  came  to  have.  For  the  post‐modern 
generation  this  has  often  taken  the  form  of  a  critique  of  the  legal  academy  –  of  the 
interpretative process – coupled with a more aggressive assertion of self. Thus, we find 






self  in  post‐modern  work.  And  this  final  move  is  an  odd  one,  for  the  interdisciplinary 
literatures  relied  upon  by  the  post‐modern  concern  little  so  centrally  as  the 
disestablishment of the autonomous self. 
 
Before  exploring  the  difficulties  posed  for  the  post‐modern  legal  scholar,  by  this 
preoccupation with the self, we should begin to take note of the mechanisms which mark 










































American  legal  scholars  of  the  post‐modern  persuasion,  no  less  than  other  American 




































































recapitulated  in  the  legal  academy's  self  image  –  most  particularly  in  the  relationship 











speak  the  law  in  both  of  its  voices  –  as  a  disembodied  apolitical  culture  which 
















and  fealty  –  and  as  the  honorable  and  direct  expression  of  well  considered  political 







between  his  lectures,  in  the  anecdotes,  he  communicates  a  cruder  vision  –  of  politics 
everywhere, of himself as a public personage, responsible. And he is responsible both to 










and he typically comports himself in both teaching and scholarship so as to avoid political 2011]                                                       363  A Rotation in Contemporary Legal Scholarship 
 
























ambition  to  serve.  The  complicated  relationships  between  private  advocacy  and  public 
neutrality,  between  public  faith  and  private  cynicism,  like  the  relations  between 















of  the  law  and  the  profession  –  codifying,  compiling,  systematizing,  recommending, 





















voice  about  the  world  of  ideas.  Despite  its  assertion  that  politics  is  the  stuff  of  his 





thing  –  it  all  depends  upon  what  you  want".  The  voice  formulating  the  legislative 
alternatives in this way moves from the first to the second person plural in a time and 
place somewhere between always or whenever and soon, after graduation. Initially – in 
the  opening  "we"  phrase  –  such  a  statement  constitutes  a  class  identity  somewhere 
between social engineer and general will and seems located in the present. The second 
phrase,  the  implementation,  seems  addressed  to  a  student  body  constituted  as 
practitioners,  those  who  will  actually  live  out  the  practice  of  social  engineering  in  the 























between  mainstream  legal  culture  and  the  profession  –  they  seem  to  reaffirm  the 
mainstream's  commitment  to  politics  by  others.  When  they  imagine  that  a  legal 



















participation  in  the  culture  of  legal  academia  –  undercutting  his  independence, 
oppositional  bite  and  believability  as  resolutely  as  it  would  that  of  the  mainstream. 
Moreover,  such  overt  political  commitment  often  seems  to  clash  with  his  intellectual 




claim  to  eschew  political  speech,  resolutely  opposing  any  discussion  of  "policy"  which 
might obscure his project of doctrinal elaboration and critique. If the law's so autonomous, 
lets see if it can sustain this. This return to an unapologetic scrutiny of doctrine seems            [Vol. 12 No. 01  366  German Law Journal 
important, for it avoids the easy patois of justification. But a strong denial of politics makes 
legal  scholars  as  uneasy  as  an  overt  political  commitment.  Sometimes  it  is  simply  not 
noticed – it would be just like the left to pretend to discuss only doctrine. Usually it simply 







education.  Nevertheless,  the  CLS  tone  again  seems  different,  more  assertive,  more 
insistent.  Sometimes  it  must  sound  to  the  mainstream  scholar  like  praying  on  street 
corners. Yet the tonal change also marks a challenge, extending the mainstream's ambition 



































institutional  or  class  status  as  intellectuals  be  they  mainstream  reformers  or  campus 










finally  enforcing  rights,  etc.)  as  by  pushing  society  to  the  limit  ("deconstructing"  and 
historicizing  liberalism,  disaggregating  rights,  completing  the  project  of  the  market)? 
Critical legal studies marked its difference from the mainstream when it began developing 






familiar  from  the  mainstream  –  separating  the  critique  from  the  elaborative  political 
engagement.  Sometimes  the  CLS  critique  of  program  was  broader,  suggesting  the 
impossibility  of  coherent  programmatic  thought.  However  strong  this  seemed  as  an 
intellectual challenge, it always seemed possible simply to assert that it was not true to 
anyone's experience – including the experience of the critical legal scholar. Challenged by 
the  voice  of  political  savvy,  the  CLS  scholar  could  only  acknowledge  his  own  political 











            [Vol. 12 No. 01  368  German Law Journal 
Sometimes,  CLS  critics  assert  that  despite  or  alongside  or  before  or  underneath  their 
intellectual assertion of the indeterminacy of legal culture, they stand for some collection 
of programs and positions. After working their way through a critical exercise, CLS scholars 
often  find  themselves  enumerating  a  political  creed  of  sorts.  For  some  reason  this 
tendency seems at least partly to be demanded by the very audience which is disturbed by 
its audacity. Although, the CLS response may be more overt than the mainstream tendency 
to  demur,  to  shrug,  to  refer  out  to  the  audience  or  onward  to  practice,  it  remains  a 


































purport  of  the  CLS  political  critique  is  sustained  (hiding  its  reliance  upon  stable  client 

































Usually,  the  critical  legal  scholar  succumbs  to  this  pressure.  At  least,  he  finds  himself 



























add  senior  citizens,  shareholders,  entrepreneurs,  unborn  children,  neo‐Nazis  and  the 
middle class to the list, one would have listed those on whose behalf the mainstream also 






which  themselves  reflect  the  thousands  of  ways  law  bisects  society.  When  the 








away  from  the  combination  of  vague  generality  and  intense  specificity  to  a  mystical 
invocation of some single other. In this mode, a single group is singled out and given a 





mystically,  the  group  is  identified  as  an  unspeakable  voice,  absolutely  other  to  legal 
culture, the political redeemer of legal work which no longer feels comfortable expressing 

























scholarship.  The  image  of  the  state  as  a  "center  of  power"  or  a  "sovereignty"  which 
actually exists, is factual and is the site of either law or politics or both, which is developed 
independent  of  the  narrative  of  law's  history,  alongside  it,  before  or  ancillary  to  law's 
image of sovereignty has been increasingly criticized. In this, these critical scholars seem to 
seek an image of the state as an imaginary relationship between law and politics, as a site 













Like  earlier  CLS  work,  this  problem  is  stabilized  somewhat  by  a  combination  of  self‐
























legal  culture.  In  this,  the  post‐modern  seems  to  sustain  his  position  by  reversing  the 
relationship  of  political  and  intellectual  uneasiness.  If  the  CLS  scholar  reversed  the 
mainstream relationship to both neutrality and doubt within the realms of politics and 
intellection in order to create a difference from the mainstreamer while remaining in the 
discourse  of  the  legal  academy,  the  post‐modernist  seems  to  reverse  the  relationship 











CLS.  In  short,  the  move  which  was  to  save  post‐modern  criticism  from  manneristic 
imitation may also be read to have simply continued it.  
 





because  it  is  approached  as  either  the  theory  of  left  intellectuals  or  the  practice  of 
academic politicians. What is their theory and what do they think should be done? Like 










focus  a  great  deal  of  energy  on  the  boundaries  of  their  collective  project,  wondering 
whether their own or another's project is inside or outside the realm of legal scholarship. 

























legal scholarship. The realist problematic of law's simultaneous independence and bite            [Vol. 12 No. 01  374  German Law Journal 

































mega‐model,  aping  the  relationship  between  scholarly  modes  of  understanding  and 
doctrinal patterns – and elaborates it through a body of theoretical and doctrinal work. 
This  modeled  instability  develops  a  polyphonous  theme  which  ends,  somewhat 
incongruously, where it began, with an invocation, perhaps somewhat problematized, of 

















Such  a  reading  would  emphasize  that  the  post‐modern  legal  text  is  situated  in  legal 
scholarship – responding to the demands of legal academia as it comments upon them – 
and would credit the comment as much as the response. It would see a homology among 
the uneasiness and necessity of theory and politics for the mainstream, for CLS and for 
post‐modern legal scholars. Far from excoriating the post‐modern for his participation in 
the vernacular of a destabilized profession, such a reading would give the post‐modern 
credit for recognizing the complexly ironic nature of contemporary legal teaching. In their 
teaching and writing the post‐modern legal scholar, like his predecessors, constantly seeks 
the high ground of his profession – a high ground of intellection, of skepticism about ideas, 
of political commitment, of cynicism about politics – rotating through the positions of the 
mainstream and the CLS legal teacher or author with both some combination of violent 
abandon and careful finesse. This rotation would be read both as just one more turn of the 
wheel and as indicating, at least between the lines, a new project and voice for the legal 
scholar – one which upends, restates, recapitulates, and refuses as it continues the uneasy 
tradition of post‐realist legal scholarship. 